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ABSTRACT: 
From to beginning of year 2002, the Spanish Autonomous Communities (CC. AA.) 
fiscal performance is conditioned by a new legal framework compounded from the 
financial agreement and the legislation on budget stability. This new framework 
implies a change in the CC. AA. fiscal behaviour. Are the CC. AA. ready to provide its 
citizens the public services they demand and fulfil its fiscal stability commitments? Are 
all the CC. AA. in the same position?. Using political economic models and data on 
past budgets execution, this paper is aimed at shedding light over the factors that 
jeopardize the CC. AA. budget stability in the future and the differences between CC. 
AA. relevant to its fiscal performance. 
JEL Code: H61, H62, H71, H72, H77 
 
During the last 25 years, in Spain it has been built a fiscal federal system from 
nothingness. Today, the “Comunidades Autónomas” (CC. AA.), the Spanish political 
entities in the regions, originated in 1977, manage more than 50% of the Spanish public 
expenditure and the two main public functions: health and education. 
The CC. AA. development process has been continuous as they have been receiving 
transferred public services all along this period. When this public services, previously 
managed by the “Administración General del Estado” (AGE), the Spanish general 
government, are transferred, the CC. AA. get the means needed to finance them. 
The 17 Spanish CC. AA. can be divided in two types, in regard only to its tax 
competences, because all the CC. AA. have the same level of potential expenditure 
  1competences. The division is based on the Spanish Constitution, which maintains the 
historical regime of the “foral” CC. AA. 
The foral CC. AA. (País Vasco y Navarra) own and collect all the taxes levied in its 
territory and pay the AGE a transfer that covers the AGE expenditures cost in these CC. 
AA.
1. The remaining 15 CC. AA., so called “comunes” (common), are financed mainly by 
transfers from the AGE. This paper only deals with the latter. 
Before 2002, the CC. AA. main financial resource was a general transfer intended to 
cover the minimum level of public services managed by the CC. AA. At the beginning of 
2002, there was a sentiment that the regional spending had not direct cost, for the citizens 
the regional governments are providing services without collecting revenue. As most 
revenue was provided by AGE transfers, there was an absence of a fiscal accountability of 
regional authorities to taxpayers, whereas the AGE tax burden was regarded as too high. 
In 2002 a new legal framework compounded from the financial agreement and the 
legislation on budget stability has been brought into force. This new framework implies a 
change in the CC. AA. fiscal behaviour. First, the new financial agreement is based on the 
fiscal responsibility of the CC. AA., i. e., the CC. AA. prime financial resources are the 
taxes payed by their citizens and the transfers from the AGE are to play a marginal role. 
Secondly, the legislation on budget stability has two basic implications for the CC. AA., 
they have to approve and execute a no-deficit budget and public debt can only be used to 
finance financial assets acquisitions. 
In this context, there is a need to know if the CC. AA. are able to deal with the new 
financial environment and what are the differences between CC. AA. related to its future 
fiscal sustainability. The modern literature on fiscal sustainability, the new political 
economics, considers the social and institutional features as the main explanations for the 
differences in the fiscal performance across countries. 
This paper is divided in four parts. The first part shortly surveys the literature on 
political economics. The second part explains the CC. AA. financial resources and the 
                                                 
1 Technically, the subjects of the financial relationships with AGE are the three provintial entities 
(Diputaciones) in País Vasco and the Diputación de Navarra; not all the taxes paid in País Vasco and 
Navarra belong to the Diputaciones and the transfers paid by the Diputaciones to the AGE are determined 
indirectly, as a (fixed) percentage of the budgetary programs managed by the AGE in País Vasco and 
Navarra. 
  2main elements of the financial relationships between AGE and CC. AA. It ends with a 
model based in the common pool problem that shows a bias to an excess of expenditure in 
the CC. AA. The third part deals with the sources of information about the CC. AA. 
budgetary performance, the problems that come up when using them and the two 
dependent variables used in the empirical test. The fourth part is devoted to explain the 
empirical test results and the paper is closed with some conclusions. 
1. The political economics of budget processes. 
The neoclassical theory of fiscal policy and the Keynesian models of aggregate 
demand management both give arguments for the use of deficit and debt as fiscal policy 
instruments (Milesi, 1999). The tax-smoothing theory stresses that tax rates should be kept 
constant to avoid distortions of the private agents decisions, so budget deficits should be 
used to cover temporary increases in government spending. 
Keynesian models of aggregate demand consider budget deficit as a fiscal policy 
instrument: in order to moderate business cycle fluctuations, there can be deficits during 
recessions. 
Both theories provide explanations for budget deficits in developed countries, but not 
for the differences in the fiscal performance across countries. The political economy 
models of fiscal policy focus on the political and institutional factors to explain the 
differences in fiscal policy across countries at a similar level of economic and social 
development. 
Alesina and Perotti (1995) classify the political economy models into six groups: 
models based in “fiscal illusion”, models of debt as a strategic variable, of distributional 
conflict, of intergenerational redistribution, of geographic dispersed interests and models 
emphasizing the effects of budgetary institutions. 
The political economy models can be regrouped in two categories: models based in 
fragmentation and the common pool problem and models based in the political cycle. 
The concept of fragmentation (Weingast et al, 1981) emphasizes the bias to 
inefficiency created by the distributive politics, namely the projects, programs and grants 
that concentrate the benefits in geographically or socially defined groups of citizens, while 
spreading their costs across all citizens through general taxation (common pool of 
resources). 
  3Perotti (1998) distinguish three types of fragmentation: political, procedural and 
social. Political fragmentation is related to the political process of bargaining and 
negotiations among parties within the government or the parliament. Procedural 
fragmentation focus on the role and relative power of players participating in the budget 
process (prime minister, finance minister and spending ministers). Social fragmentation 
emphasizes the relations among government and different interest groups. 
The political fragmentation models (Hallerberg y Hagen, 97; Persson et al., 00; 
Milesi et al., 01 and Persson et al., 03) link the electoral systems and political regimes with 
the weakness in the government that leads to an excess of expenditure. 
Electoral institutions are the legal rules that convert the citizens votes into 
representatives in the parliament. Electoral institutions influence the likelihood of one 
party winning a majority of legislative seats and consequently having the ability to form a 
one-party majority government. There are two electoral systems, proportional and plurality 
systems. In plurality systems only one representative is elected per district and in 
proportional systems more than one representative is elected per district. The latter tend to 
have a larger number of political parties in parliament than plurality systems, so that 
plurality systems tend to have one-party majority parliaments and governments and 
proportional systems are likely to have a multi-party parliament majority and multi-party 
or minority governments. 
Minority governments are weaker and more fragmented than majority ones. Multi-
party majority governments are more fragmented than one-party majority governments 
(Persson et al., 03). In one-party governments there are conflicts between government and 
opposition in parliament and in multi-party governments are these conflicts and also 
among different party ministers.  
The empirical test of these models do not show a definitive evidence that minority 
and coalition governments (more fragmented governments) spend more and generate more 
deficits than majority and one-party governments. Roubini y Sachs, (1989a) find evidence 
that political fragmentation is related with budget deficit, but Haan and Sturm (1994 y 
1997) criticize the political Roubini and Sachs´ fragmentation index and do not find 
statistical evidence that political fragmentation is correlated with public debt and 
expenditure. 
  4In a 19 industrialized countries panel covering the 1970-1995 period, Perotti and 
Kontopoulus (2002) find a significant link between political fragmentation and public 
expenditure and budget deficits. Persson et al (2003) find that coalition governments tend 
to spend more than one-party governments. 
Procedural fragmentation occurs when representatives of particular (geographic or 
social) spending interest are allowed to make spending decisions without taking the full 
cost of public policy programs into consideration (Perotti et al., 1997). Procedural 
fragmentation can be overcome by strengthening elements of centralization in the budget 
process, i. e., institutions that force the budget agents to take into account the full costs and 
benefits of budgetary decisions. 
There are two approaches to centralization in the budget process: delegation of 
significant budgetary powers to the finance minister and contracting spending and deficit 
targets among the spending ministers before the beginning of the budget process. The first 
approach is more likely to produce an effective control on expenditures and deficits. 
Hagen (1992) developed a methodology to test the empirical effects of budgeting 
procedures on the fiscal instability in the European Community countries. He characterized 
the budgeting process as divided in three stages: the government prepares the budget draft, 
the legislative approves the budget law and the administration executes the budget law. In 
each stage there are interests in conflict and the budgeting procedures are the framework 
where these conflicts have to be resolved. 
Hagen suggests that the budgeting procedures oriented to enforce long-run 
orientation of fiscal policies are conducive to fiscal stability (long-term constraint 
hypothesis) and budgeting procedures that give strong powers to the finance minister, limit 
parliamentary amendments and facilitate strict execution of the budget law lead to greater 
fiscal discipline (structural hypothesis). He finds strong empirical support for the structural 
hypothesis but not significant results for the long-term hypothesis. 
Alesina et al (1996) use this methodology to explain cross country differences in 
fiscal positions considering a sample of Latin American countries. They find that 
budgeting procedures that attribute a strong role to the finance minister, limit the role of 
the legislative in amending the budget draft and limit the prerogatives of the spending 
ministers lead to lower primary deficits. 
  5In the United States of America, most states have a constitutional or statutory 
limitation restricting the government ability to run deficits, that can be prospective, or 
beginning of the year requirements, or retrospective, or end of the year requirements. 
Using data for the period 1970-1991, Bohn and Inman (1996) find that not every limitation 
has positive effects on limiting state’s deficit. Only constitutional end of the year 
requirements have significant positive effects. 
Political cycles models are based on the predominant motivation of politicians 
(Alesina, 1989). Politicians are driven by two main motivations: electoral and partisan. 
Electoral motivations characterizes the electoral cycles theory: politicians try to create the 
most desirable economic conditions immediately before the elections, before any elections 
the economy is overstimulated with expansionary policies. 
Partisan motivations characterizes the partisan cycles theory: political parties have 
different preferences over the trade-off between inflation and unemployment because of 
the redistributive consequences and over the size of the public sector. Left-wing parties 
choose a combination of lower unemployment (higher inflation) because it favours lower 
rent classes. Right-wing parties choose a combination of lower inflation (higher 
unemployment) that favours upper rent classes. Left-wing parties tend to spend more and 
produce more deficits than right-wing parties. 
Using a panel of 13 countries for the period 1961-1993, Alesina et al. (1997) find 
statistical evidence of the electoral cycle theory, but no statistical evidence of the partisan 
cycle. Buti and Noord (2003) use data from the countries that are in the European 
Monetary Union for the period 1998-2002 and find a discretionary loosening in the fiscal 
policy in pre- and early election years. 
Seitz (2000) examines fiscal performance of the German Laender since 1970 and 
does not find evidence of partisan cycles. 
2. The financial relationships between AGE and CC. AA. 
The CC. AA. financial resources before the 2002 financial agreement can be grouped 
in three classes, each of them linked to one of its financial system basic principles: 
sufficiency, autonomy and solidarity. 
The resources linked to sufficiency are the general transfer that covers the minimum 
level of public services, the normative level of revenue to be obtained from the taxes 
managed by the CC. AA. and the earmarked transfers from AGE and the European Union. 
  6The general transfer from AGE, the so-called Participation in State revenues, has 
been the CC. AA. main source of revenues before 2002. Two periods can be distinguish: 
the current cost period and the definitive period. 
From 1978 to 1987 (current cost period) the CC. AA. received from the AGE a 
transfer calculated yearly. Each Autonomous Community transfer was the addition of the 
current cost of all the public services managed by the Community, individually considered. 
A transferred service cost was defined as the amount of money that the AGE would have 
spent in this service in case it would had not been transferred to the Autonomous 
Community. 
After 1987 (definitive period) the general transfer was calculated employing the rules 
and figures contained in the financial agreement between AGE and CC. AA. in force each 
year. From 1987 to 2001 there has been three financial agreements, covering periods 1987-
1991, 1992-1996 and 1997-2001. 
Every financial agreement has a base-year, namely a year to refer the global cost of 
all services
2 transferred to each Autonomous Community: 1996 (period 1987-1991), 1990 
(1992-1996) and 1996 (1997-2001). These base-year global funds were determined 
through a political bargaining between AGE and the CC. AA. and as new services were 
transferred to a particular Autonomous Community, its costs calculated in terms of the 
base-year were added to the base-year global fund for this Community. 
The CC. AA. received yearly a transfer calculated increasing its base-year global 
fund by a same index for all of them. Generally, this index was the increase of the AGE tax 
revenues between base-year and current year if higher than the nominal Spanish Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) increase, because the nominal Spanish GDP growth was the 
yearly guaranteed increase. 
Before 1984 the CC. AA. were transferred the taxes levied on inheritance, wealth 
and sales not taxed by the Value Added Tax. A normative (estimated minimum) level of 
revenue from these taxes was deducted from the base-year global fund. 
Finally, the CC. AA. receive from AGE and the European Union a number of 
earmarked transfers. The most important is the transfer linked to the health services, 
                                                 
2 But health services. 
  7because the cost of these transferred services was not included in the base-year global fund 
for the CC. AA. that managed them after 2002; Cataluña. Galicia, Andalucía, Comunidad 
Valenciana and Canarias. 
The financial resources linked to autonomy are the difference between actual and 
normative level of revenue obtained from the taxes managed by CC. AA., revenues from 
properties and no-public services and credit operations. 
As it is been said, before 1984 the CC. AA. were transferred the taxes levied on 
inheritance, wealth and sales not taxed by the Value Added Tax. They have competences 
no only to tax the citizens in its territory, but also to increase the general rates established 
by the AGE. As a minimum level of revenue from this taxes was deducted from the 
general fund, the CC. AA. have an incentive to increase the revenues from these taxes and 
a disincentive to do that because of the political costs involved in a tax increase. 
The CC. AA. have the competence to issue public debt. Before 1992 there was only 
two limits and a binding procedure: the new long-term debt has to be used only to finance 
new investments, the financial expenditures had to be less than 25% of current revenues 
and the AGE had to allow all bonds issues and foreign-currency nominated debts. 
Additionally, in 1992 all the CC. AA. agreed with AGE deficit scenarios that, supposedly, 
limited the deficit and debt growth from 1992 to 2002, but the scenarios are not public and 
the CC. AA. in fact have been increasing its public debt. 
The financial resources linked to solidarity are the Interterritorial Compensation 
Fund (FCI) and the transfers from the social and structural European Union funds. The FCI 
is aimed at help the less developed CC. AA. by transferring resources for new public 
investments. 
The financial resources’ grouping by financial basic principles allows us to identify 
two types of CC. AA. expenditures: minimum expenditure and autonomous expenditure. 
Minimum expenditure is the lowest level of expenditure that an Autonomous 
Community can execute and is financed by the resources linked to sufficiency and 
solidarity. 
Autonomous expenditure is the extra money that an Autonomous Community decide 
to expend over the minimum level. It can be seen as the extra money that the Autonomous 
Community settles on to better off the quality of the public services it manages. The 
resources linked to autonomy fund this autonomous expenditure. 
  8Previous to the empirical analysis, we develop a simple model of fiscal relationship 
between AGE and CC. AA. that reveal some relevant ideas about fiscal CC. AA. fiscal 
responsibility. The model is inspired in Persson and Tabellini (1994 and 2002). 
Consider the 15 common CC. AA. with a population N
J, ∑ =
J
J N N,   where N is the 
whole population in the Spanish common CC. AA. We suppose that all the individuals in 
each Autonomous Community have the same quasi-linear preferences: 
) (
J J J g H c w + =  
c
J is the consumption of private goods (the same for every individual) and g
J is the 
per capita supply of the publicly provided goods. H(.) is a concave and increasing function. 
The individual consumption is: 
)y - (1 c
J J τ =  
Government spending is financing by taxing the income of every individual (y) at a 
common rate  .  τ
The optimum level of public goods provision in each Autonomous Community can 
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The optimal provision of J local public goods is determined where the average 
marginal benefit in each Autonomous Community equals the marginal social cost of unity: 
0 1 ) (
* = − g H g  
where g
* is the vector of optimum level of J local public goods. 
This allocation could be implemented if lump-sum taxes levied in each Autonomous 
Community ( ) financed each of the J local public goods. 
J τ
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AGE
j g  are the public services supplied by the AGE (not transferred to CC. AA.). 
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j g  denote the minimum level of expenditures on transferred services, those 
financed by the resources linked to sufficiency and solidarity. 
AUT
j g  denote the Autonomous Community j autonomous expenditure. 
The taxes paid by every individual can be divided as follows: 
CA AGE τ τ τ + =  
AGE τ  are the taxes paid to the AGE and   are the taxes paid to the Autonomous 
Community. 
CA τ
Public services supplied by AGE and minimum level of expenditures on transferred 
services are financed out of a common pool of AGE tax revenues ( ) and each 
Autonomous Community autonomous expenditures are financed through its own taxes. 
AGE
J N τ *
Individual utility in Autonomous Community J can then be written as: 
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The equilibrium spending condition of public services supplied by the AGE and 
minimum level of expenditures on transferred services shows the common-pool problem: 
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As the right hand side of these equations is negative, there is a bias to overspending 
to the social optimum. Each Autonomous Community internalizes the benefit of the 
  10expenditure located in its territory but internalizes only the fraction ( N
N J ) of the social 
marginal cost of higher AGE taxes needed to finance them. 
The following conclusions can be extracted from the model: 
First, in all the negotiations between AGE and CC. AA. to determine the year-base 
initial funds there has been a CC. AA. strong incentive to overvalue the costs of the 
services they manage, because these costs determined its initial resources fund, i. e. the 
part of the common pool of resources they became. This means that every year-base 
negotiation, the AGE has been obliged to increase the part of the general taxes revenues 
apportioned to the CC. AA. in order to reach a financial agreement. 
Secondly, there is a CC. AA. great disincentive to finance the transferred services 
with own taxes, because they internalize all the costs, and an incentive to finance them 
with transfers from the AGE, because they internalise only part of the costs. The AGE 
prefers exactly the opposite. This conflict means that CC. AA. only accept more fiscal 
responsibility (less AGE transfers and more own tax resources) if the change implies more 
net financial resources to finance its expenditure competences. 
3. The CC. AA. financial data. 
Previous to the development of the empirical analysis, some words are to be said on 
the CC. AA. financial information used in this paper. First, is explained why it is used 
budgetary instead of national accounts data and why the data sources are not the CC. AA., 
but the Spanish Ministry of Finance publications. Secondly, there is an explanation of how 
are defined the two dependent variables used in the empirical tests. 
The financial activity of a public entity can be displayed through budgetary or 
national accounts data. The latter uses an international common methodology, so it can be 
interpreted without having to understand the Spanish public accountability rules, but there 
are some reasons that lead us to use the budgeting information. 
The first reason is the length of the time series. There are national accounts data 
separated for each Autonomous Community only from 1995 and budgetary data from 
1986. The second reason is the level of aggregation of national accounts data, which makes 
impossible to distinguish between minimum and autonomous expenditure. 
There are two types of budgetary data, pre-execution and executed data. Pre-
execution data are the figures included in the budget approved by the parliament. Executed 
  11data are those that result of the budget execution. As the figures that show the actual 
revenues and expenditures are the budget executed ones, those are used in this paper. 
The sources of budget executed data are not the CC. AA., but the Spanish Ministry 
of Finance publications because of two reasons: availability and homogeneity. The 
executed budget data are not directly available from the CC. AA., because there is no legal 
obligation to publish them. Also, as an aspect of its political autonomy, the CC. AA. are 
empowered to decide its budget accounting rules so, in practice, its data are not 
homogeneous. 
The Spanish Ministry of Finance publish anually a survey of the budget execution 
homogeneized data of all the CC. AA. This publications, alongside with the information of 
the payments made by the AGE to the CC. AA., also published by the Spanish Ministry of 
Finance, allows to generate the pool time series used in the empirical analysis. The last 
year with available complete data is 2000, so we lack of data of the last year of the 1997-
2001 period. 
In the empirical studies where the subjects are the countries, the dependent variables 
are public expenditure and deficit, generally as percentage on GDP to avoid the problem 
with the counties different size. The empirical analysis of the CC. AA. has to deal with the 
different number of services transferred to the CC. AA. in every year of the period 
considered (1986-2000). 
It is necessary to find a variable that equalize the data of CC. AA. with different 
levels of public services managed. This variable is the amount of the resources linked to 
the principle of sufficiency, because they are proporcional to the cost of the services 
managed every year. 
The dependent variables used in the empirical tests are two: financial authonomy 
(autfin) and budget deficit (defpre). Financial autonomy is defined as the autonomuos 
expenditure divided by the resources linked to the principle of sufficiency. It measures, for 
every Autonomous Community and every year from 1986 to 2000, the financial effort of 
the Community to improve the services it manages. 
Budget deficit is defined as the actual expenditure not covered with current and 
capital revenues divided by the resources linked to the principle of sufficiency. It 
measures, for every Autonomous Community and every year from 1986 to 2000, the actual 
budgetary deficit. 
  124. Empirical analysis of the CC. AA. financial data. 
The empirical analysis is divided in two parts: the relationship and evolution of 
financial autonomy and budget deficit and the causes of the differences among CC. AA. 
The two firsts columns of Table 1 show a great disparity in financial autonomy and 
budgetary deficit. Usually, bigger deficits are related to more expenditure. In order to 
verify it for the CC. AA., two statistical tests are made to measure the relationship between 
these variables. 
First, for each Autonomous Community a least square regression with budget deficit 
is the dependent variable and financial autonomy the independent variable. As can be seen, 
only 5 Communities have a significant coefficient and in one of them (Castilla y León) the 
sign is positive (more expenditures are related with less deficit). 
Secondly, the last two columns show the results of a Granger causality test, with two 
lags in each variable. The null hypothesis is that financial autonomy does not cause 
budgetary deficit and can only be rejected in two cases: Galicia and La Rioja. 
The great disparity among CC. AA. in both financial autonomy and budgetary deficit 
and the lack of relationship between these variables can be interpreted as follows: the CC. 
AA. are very different in its ability to generate autonomous revenues and the decisions 
about incurring in budget deficit are not related with more expenditure. 
Table 2 shows the evolution of financial autonomy and budget deficit along the 
period 1986-2000. As the years past, there is a clear convergence in the figures (the 
statistical deviations of both financial autonomy and budget deficit decrease progressively) 
and the means are smaller. 
In order to analize the causes of differences in financial autonomy and budget deficit, 
number of tests have been made inspired by the political economy models surveyed in 
section 1. There is no analysis related to procedural fragmentation because the budgetary 
rules are identical in all the CC. AA.. Tables 3 to 7 show the results of the tests. 
As commented in relation with table 2, as the year considered is closer to the end of 
the period (year 2000), there is more convergence in the CC. AA. figures. It has an 
important consequence on the econometric analysis, because it can generate 
heterokedasticity. Also, it is very plausible that CC. AA. fiscal performances in the same 
year are correlated, so there can be a autocorrelation problem. 
  13In order to deal with these circumstances, all variances and standard errors are 
White´s heterocedasticity-consistent and the coefficients are estimated using feasible 
generalized least squares (Gujarati, 2003). 
All the regressions include the dependent variable lagged one period as control 
variable. 
In table 3 there is an analysis on the relationship between fiscal performance and the 
amount of competences managed by the CC. AA. by means of three variables. The first 
variable (finpib) is defined as the proportion of the revenues linked to sufficiency to the 
regional GDP. The greater the variable is the more level of competences has the 
Autonomous Community. 
The two biggest public services managed by the CC. AA. are health and education. 
Because of that, two dummy variables are defined: education management (ejeedu), value 
0 when the Autonomous Community does not manage education and 1 when does, and 
health management (ejesan), value 0 when the Autonomous Community does not manage 
health and 1 when does. 
Table 3 shows that sufficiency revenues divided to GDP are significative in 
explaining both financial autonomy and budget deficit. But the coefficients seem to have 
the contrary sign as expected: more competences (sufficiency revenues) should have been 
related to more autonomous expenditures and deficit. 
This paradox can be explained. First, there is no relation between more services 
transferred to an Autonomous Community and the ability to generate autonomous 
revenues. The most important source of autonomous revenues, the taxes levied on 
inheritance, wealth and sales not taxed by the Value Added Tax, were transferred to all the 
CC. AA. in 1984 disregard for the level of services managed. Secondly, as the CC. AA. are 
transferred new services, they are financed by the general transfer, so there is no increase 
in its ability to generate autonomous revenues. 
The management of the education services does not explain both financial autonomy 
and budget deficit. The (significative) coefficients of the variable ejesan show the 
commented paradox, before 2002 the health services were completely financed by an 
earmarked transfer. 
Political fragmentation is measured by two variables: majority in parlament 
(mayabs), value 1 when the government has majority in parliament and 0 when not and 
  14coalition government, value 0 when the government is one-party and 1 in other cases. 
Table 4 shows little evidence of the political fragmentation model, because only more 
budgeting deficit can be explained by minority governments. 
Looking for partisan cycles, three variables are defined. The first is the common one: 
political orientation of the main government party (sigpol), value 1 when the main party in 
government is left-wing and 0 when right-wing. 
The second variable is political orientation of the party in AGE government related 
to political orientation of the main party in the Autonomous Community government 
(gobnac). Tooks value 0 when both parties are the same and 1 when the main party in the 
Autonomous Community government is opposed to the party in AGE government. We 
expect more financial autonomy and budget deficit when the main party in the 
Autonomous Community government is opposed to the party in AGE government. 
The third variable is nationalist party in the Autonomous Community government 
(parnac). Tooks value 0 when there is no nationalist party in the Autonomous Community 
government and 1 in the other cases (a nationalist party is main or minoritary in the 
Autonomous Community government). We expect more financial autonomy and budget 
deficit when the party in the Autonomous Community government is nationalist. 
Table 5 shows no evidence for partisan cycles in the Spanish CC. AA. 
The electoral cycles models are estimated through the common variables. Electoral 
year (añoele) tooks value 1 in years when there is a regional election and 0 in the rest. 
Postelectoral year (añopos) tooks value 1 in postelectoral years and 0 in the rest. 
Table 6 does not include significant coefficients for electoral years, only a significant 
coefficient relating postelectoral years and financial autonomy. This coefficient has the 
expected sign. 
The last analysis in this paper tries to find the relationships between business cycles 
and the fiscal variables. The common theory explains that in expansionary years there are 
less expenditures and deficits. 
The CC. AA. relative situation in respect of the bussines cycle is measured by the 
GDP gap. Using regional GDPs published by the Spanish Statistical Institute and the 
Hodrick-Prescott filter, it has been built the variable GDP gap (pibgap) as the difference 
between real and potential GDP yearly growth. 
  15The relationship between regional and Spanish general GDP gaps is also relevant, as 
the CC. AA. main resource (general transfer) increases as does the Spanish general GDP. 
The variable difference between regional a general GDP gap (difgap) is constructed 
substracting Spanish general GDP gap from regional GDP gap. It measures the position of 
the Autonomous Community in the cycle relative to the Spanish general economy one. 
Table 7 reflects some annoying results. A positive regional GDP gap means bigger 
autonomous revenues, but the coefficient (elasticity) is very small: one percentage point of 
GDP gap means only a quarter of percentage point increase in autonomous revenues. 
Worse than that, a positive GDP gap is related not with less deficits but with bigger 
ones. And the coefficient is astonishing big: one percentage point of GDP gap means much 
more than one percentage point increase in budget deficit. 
The relationship between regional and general GDP gap gives no tranquility either. 
As expected, the financial autonomy coefficient is not significative (the difference between 
regional and general relative situation has no relationship with the CC. AA. autonomous 
revenues). But the budget deficit coefficient is significative, negative and quite big. 
5. Conclusions. 
1.  The analysis of the relationship between financial autonomy and budget deficit shows 
that the CC. AA. are very different in its ability to generate autonomous revenues and 
the decisions about incurring in budget deficit are not related with more expenditure. 
2.  The analysis of the relationships between the level of public services managed and 
the fiscal variables shows a paradox: more expenditure is related with less financial 
autonomy and less budget deficit. The finantial systems in law before 2002 justify the 
paradox. 
3.  There is very little evidence of the political economic models in the Spanish CC. AA. 
Only minoritary governments explain more deficits and postelectoral years are 
significatively related to a decrease in autonomous expenditures. 
4.  The business cycle analysis evidences some alarming results. Positive GDP gaps 
have very little impact on the CC. AA. autonomous expenditures but a great negative 
impact on budget deficits. Better relative positions in the bussines cycle than the 
Spanish general economy (positive difference between regional and general GDP 
gap) are related with bigger budget deficits. 
  165.  The CC. AA. that are more prone to suffer long variations in its GDP growth and 
whose business cycle tend to differ more from the Spanish business cycle, i. e. the 
smaller and less developed ones, are more likely to suffer episodes of expenditure 
growth and uncontrollable deficits. 
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  18List of variables. 
Name Abreviation  Explanation 
Financial 
autonomy 
autfin  Autonomous expenditure divided by the resources linked to the principle 
of sufficiency. 
Budgetary deficit  defpre  Actual expenditure not covered with current and capital revenues divided 
by the resources linked to the principle of sufficiency 
Sufficiency 
revenues to GDP 




ejeedu  0 when the Autonomous Community does not manage education services 
and 1 when does. 
Health 
management 
ejesan  0 when the Autonomous Community does not manage health services and 
1 when does. 
Majority in 
parliament 
mayabs  0 when the government has majority in parliament and 1 when not. 
Coalition 
government 
coalgo  0 when the government is one-party and 1 in other cases. 
Orientation of the 
government party 





gobnac  0 when the main party in the Autonomous Community government is 
opposed to the party in AGE government and 1 if not. 
Nationalist party  parnac  0 when there is no nationalist party in the Autonomous Community 
government and 1 when a nationalist party is main or minoritary in the 
Autonomous Community government. 
Electoral year  añoele  1 in years when there is a regional election and 0 in the rest 
Post electoral year  añopos  1 in postelectoral years and 0 in the rest 
Regional GDP 
gap 
pibgap Difference  between  real  and potential GDP yearly growth 
Difference 
between regional 
and general GDP 
gap 
difgap  Regional GDP gap less general GDP gap. 
 
 
  19Table 1. Relationship between financial autonomy and budgetary deficit. 
Coefficient significance R
2 F-value Probability
Cataluña 0,2314   -0,2261   0,0665   -.- 0,0031   0,0301   0,9704  
Galicia 0,1386   -0,0962   -0,7173   99% 0,4414   4,2371   0,0556  
Andalucía 0,1280   -0,0869   -0,6289   95% 0,3916   1,3345   0,3161  
Asturias 0,3556   -0,2097   0,2133   -.- 0,0606   0,4369   0,6606  
Cantabria 0,4256   -0,2319   -0,5936   -.- 0,1771   3,1847   0,0961  
La Rioja 0,3367   -0,0903   0,2505   -.- 0,0377   9,3677   0,0080  
Murcia 0,4545   -0,2500   -0,6660   99% 0,7139   2,7520   0,1232  
C. Valenciana 0,1578   -0,1076   0,1068   -.- 0,0029   2,7804   0,1211  
Aragón 0,3573   -0,1639   -0,3422   -.- 0,1168   1,1050   0,3769  
Castilla-La Mancha 0,2167   -0,0503   0,0924   -.- 0,0074   0,3922   0,6879  
Canarias 0,4391   -0,0420   0,1690   -.- 0,0996   0,7714   0,4939  
Extremadura 0,2840   -0,0370   0,0036   -.- 0,0000   0,7526   0,5018  
Islas Baleares 0,6676   -0,1942   -0,1368   -.- 0,0312   1,3646   0,3091  
Madrid 0,5162   -0,1899   -0,5167   99% 0,5847   1,6751   0,2477  
Castilla y León 0,4395   0,1530   0,4928   99% 0,5484   1,8406   0,2200  
Mean 0,3432   -0,1215  
St. deviation 0,2500   0,2294  
Median 0,2739   -0,1018  
Granger causality test Regression analysis CC. AA. autfin     
(Mean)
defpre     
(Mean)
 
Table 2. Financial autonomy and budgetary deficit. Evolution. 
able 3. Public services managed by CC. AA. 
autfin defpre 
autfin defpre autfin defpre autfin defpre autfin defpre
Mean 0,4425   -0,0485   0,4530   -0,1518   0,3366   -0,1421   0,2628   -0,0933  
St. deviation 0,2993   0,2672   0,2304   0,2615   0,1710   0,1275   0,1508   0,07
Median 0,3618   -0,0350   0,4906   -0,1194   0,3075   -0,1361   0,2659   -0,0855  
1997-2001 Current cost period 1987-1991 1992-1996
77   
 
T
Dependent  variable  autfin defpre 
Intercept 0,137 
(7,058)***  (-6,182)***  (5,836)***  (-4,418)*** 










ejesan     -0,042 
(- *  5,624)**
0,020 
(1,890)* 
Dependent variable (-1)  0,666 
(18,159)*** 
0, 5 






2  0,648 0,583 0,833 0,579 
 
  20Table 4. Political fragmentation. 
 defpre autfin defpre  Dependent  variable  autfin
Intercept 0,038 
(6,367)***  (-4,437)***  (6,786)***  (-5,445)*** 










Dependent variable (-1)  0,763 
(24,172)*** 
0, 7 






2  0,691 0,577 0,674 0,563 
Table 5. Partisan cycle. 
tfin defpre autfin defpre autfin defpre  Dependent  variable  au
Intercept 0,044 
(5,112)***  (-5,666)*** (7,241)***  (-5,925)*** (6,180)***  (-5,633)***





    




      

















2  0,677 0,572 0,693 0,561 0,671 0,565 
Table 6. Electoral cycle
autfin defpre autfin defpre 
. 
Dependent  variable 
Intercept 0,039 
(6,109)***  (-5,914)***  (6,567)***  (-6,340)*** 










Dependent variable (-1)  0,771 
(25,529)*** 
0, 2 






2  0,684 0,565 0,693 0,560 
 
  21Table 7. Business cycle. 
autfin  defpre  autfin  Defpre  Dependent variable 
Intercept 0,032 
(6,460)***  (-9,246)***  (6,075)***  (-7,075)*** 










Dependent variable (-1)  0,795 
(31,809)*** 
0, 2 






2  0,798 0,736 0,778 0,580 
 
Common notes for tables 3 to 7: 
 
d using feasible generalized least squares and variances and 
* significance at 90%. 
** significance at 95%.
*** significance at 99% 
All coefficients estimate
standard errors are White´s heterocedasticity-consistent. 
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